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CONTRACTUAL DISCLAIMER AND LIMITATION
OF LIABILITY UNDER THE LAW OF NEW YORK
James Brook*

Our fundamental faith in freedom of contract is constantly
being put to the test. Its most severe challenge may be that
presented by contract provisions purporting to exclude or limit
the liability of one party to an agreement. We recognize in principle that the parties should be free to bargain over the instances and extent of their contractual liability; yet, when actually confronted with an exculpatory clause our conviction falters.
We are understandably concerned that the party who allowed an
exculpatory clause to deprive him of much or all of the rights
that seem to flow from other, often more prominent, provisions
may have been "hoodwinked." He may have fallen victim to
practices creating the kind of "unfair surprise" that we do not
believe the law should countenance. Even in those instances
where one party was or should have been aware of the limits
placed on the other party's obligations, there is the concern that
such a provision would not have been inserted into the agreement if the integrity and "fairness" of the bargaining process
had not been in some way compromised. Those concepts that
have evolved as countervailing forces to the unfettered freedom
of contract - whether expressed as control over adhesion contracts, unconscionability, or simply general notions of public policy - all may come into play when we are faced with such a
contract provision.
The question of the enforceability of contract provisions excluding or limiting liability is clearly quite broad. This Article
"' Associate Professor of Law, New York Law School; B.A. 1968, Harvard University;
J.D. 1972, Harvard Law SchooL
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will not directly address the philosophical questions that are involved; rather, it will provide an overview of the topic by examining the diverse ways in which the law of one jurisdiction, New
York, approaches the enforceability of such provisions. The
theme that emerges is one of variety and specialization. The balancing of the tension between the principle of freedom of contract and our basic protective instinct toward contracting parties
works itself out in varying ways. There is no single answer, certainly not in practice nor apparently in basic policy, to the question of how far a party may go in limiting his liability by contract under New York law. The result ranges from broad
validation to the outright prohibition of such attempts. The
question may be approached in one context by an intricate
code,! in another by a narrowly drawn statute,2 and in yet another by a specialized common law doctrine.3 The answer is a set
of answers, each with its own measures of clarity and confusion.
We are reminded by this compendium of what our law governing
contractual relationships has become. The traditional common
law of contract still exists, but now as the centerpiece of a much
grander and intricate montage. Indeed, by the end of this review, we will have reason to wonder whether this fundamental
center has not been overwhelmed, in this area at least, by the
more particular schemes that have grown up about it.

I.

SALE OF GOODS

Undoubtedly, the most comprehensive and detailed treatment of exculpatory provisions is that governing their inclusion
in contracts for the sale of goods found in Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code (the Code);' The Code offers a complex
See notes 4-54 and accompanying text infra.
See notes 84-104 and accompanying text infra.
I See notes 55-80 and accompanying text infra.
4 N.Y.U.C.C. art. 2 (McKinney 1964 & Supp. 1981-1982). Because of judicial extension of the Code's provisions to contracts not literally covered by its terms, the Code's
treatment of exculpatory provisions is of even more importance. See generally Murray,
Under the Spreading Analogy of Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 39 FORDHAM L. REv. 447 (1971). In New York, the Code's treatment of clauses purporting to
disclaim or limit liability has been extended to a variety of leasing transactions. See, e.g.,
Laudisio v. Amoco Oil Co., 108 Misc. 2d 245, 437 N.y.s.2d 502 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County
1981); Fairfield Lease Corp. v. U-Vend, Inc., 14 U.C.C. REP. SERvo (Callaghan) 1244 (Sup.
ct. N.Y. County 1974); Hertz Comm. Leasing Corp. v. Transportation Credit Clearing
House, 59 Misc. 2d 226, 298 N.Y.S.2d 392 (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct. 1969), rev'd on other grounds,
1
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blend of prohibition and permission, focusing in some instances
on the substantive effect of exculpatory clausesli and in others on
the manner of their presentation in an agreement.0 This is so
primarily because the Code contains separate rules for what are
considered to be two types of clauses - warranty disclaimers
and limitations of remedies. Although contractual language
often blurs the distinction between these clauses, and while they
can effect nearly identical results, they are nonetheless analytically distinct and must be considered separately.'1 An effective
warranty disclaimer restricts the substantive rights of a buyer as
to the nature or quality of the goods that he can expect under
the contract; it limits those occasions on which a seller will be
held liable for breach. 8 A limitation of remedy clause narrows
the remedy available for breach of contract to ones other than
those provided by Article 2 itself in the absence of such a
clause.9
When the clause in question is phrased in terms of a warranty disclaimer, its effect, as governed by section 2-316 of the
Code,I° is largely determined by the type of warranty on which
the buyer seeks to rely. If the buyer hopes to take advantage of
an express warranty - one created by the seller's representa64 Mise. 2d 910, 316 N.Y.S.2d 585 (App. Term 1st Dep't 1970). However, the o.naIogy to
the Code when examining transactions outside of its purview has its Jimjts. See Arnold v.
New City Condominiums Corp., 78 A.D.2d 882, 882, 433 N.Y.s.2d 196, 198 (2d Dep't
1980) (U.C.C. § 2-316 "conspicuousness" requirement not applicable to MIe of condominium); Perlmutter v. Don's Ford, Ine., 96 Mise. 2d 719, 721, 409 N.Y.s.2d 628, 630 (Utica
City Ct. 1978) (U.C.C. § 2-719 not applicable to service contract for rustproofinS).
5 See, e.g., N.Y.U.C.C. § 2-719(2) (McKinney 1964) (invalidntinS JimjtD.tion of remedy clauses that "fail of their essential purpose.").
8 See, e.g., id. § 2-316 (warranty disclaimers must be "conspicuous").
7 See Wilson Trading Corp. v. David Ferguson, Ltd.. 23 N.Y.2d 398, 402, 244 N.E.2d
685, 687, 297 N.Y.S.2d 108, 111 (1968); J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, HANDBOOK OF THE LAw
UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 471-72 (1980); Special Project: Article Ttco
Warranties In Commercial Transactions, 64 CORNELL L REv. 30, 212-15 & 224-25
(1978). Unfortunately, the courts do not always recognize this distinction. For example,
in Ziceri v. Joseph Harris Co., 33 A.D.2d 17, 304 N.y.s.2d 918 (4th Dep't 1969), the court
imposed the requirement, applicable only to warranty disclaimers, see note 20 and accompanying text infra, that the term "merchantability" be used in a clause drafted as a
remedy Jimjtation. 33 A.D.2d at 23, 304 N.Y.S.2d at 925. This result has been severely
criticized. See WHITE & SUMMERS, supra, at 472 n.181; Special Project, supra, at 212-15.
" See WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 7, at 429·57.
8 See id. at 462-85. Unlike a warranty disclaimer, a Jimjtation of remedy clauss
could theoretically be used to protect either the buyer or the seller. In practice, however,
such provisions are invariably drafted to protect the seller in the event of his breach.
10 N.Y.U.C.C. § 2-316 (McKinney 1964).

4

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 49: 1

tions during the contracting processl l - then the disclaimer is
likely to have little effect.12 While section 2-316 does not automatically invalidate disclaimers of express warranties, it renders
ineffective attempted disclaimers to the extent they are inconsistent with the words or conduct creating the express warranty. IS
Thus, while an attempted disclaimer may encourage a narrow
interpretation of ambiguous representations claimed by the
buyer to create an express warranty, it cannot override express
warranties that are unambiguous. 14 However, the operation of
the parol evidence rule l15 may substantially reduce the buyer's
protection. If the representations upon which the buyer relies
took place before a final writing was prepared, then a clause purporting not only to disclaim warranties but to act as a merger
clause may effectively bar proof of prior representations. 1o
In contrast to the considerable difficulty of disclaiming an
express warranty, disclaimer of implied warranties of
merchantabilityl7 or of fitness for a particular purpose18 may be
relatively simple under section 2-316. The Code provides the
seller with a precise set of requirements governing the presentation of such a disclaimer in the agreement. 19 To be effective

11 See id. § 2-313 (defining conduct necessary to create an express warranty); WHITE
& SUMMERS, supra note 7, at 325·43.
11 See notes 13-15 and accompanying text infra.
13 See N.Y.U.C.C. § 2·316(1) (McKinney 1964) (disclaimers construed as consistent
with language creating express warranty unless such a construction is unreasonable);
Wilson Trading Corp. v. David Ferguson, Ltd., 23 N.Y.2d 398, 405, 244 N.E.2d 685, 689,
297 N.Y.S.2d 108, 113-14 (1968); WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 7, at 429·433. The adop·
tion of § 2·316 reversed an earlier line of cases that allowed a disclaimer to prevail over
an express warranty. See Railroad Waterproofing Corp. v. Memphis Supply, Inc., 303
N.Y. 849, 104 N.E.2d 486 (1952); Lumbrazo v. Woodruff, 256 N.Y. 92, 175 N.E. 525
(1931).
14 See WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 7, at 430.
10 N.Y.U.C.C. § 2.202 (McKinney 1964).
1. See FMC Corp. v. Seal Tape Ltd., Inc., 90 Misc. 2d 1043, 396 N.Y.S.2d 993 (Sup.
Ct. Queens County 1977); Bakal v. Burroughs Corp., 74 Misc. 2d 202, 343 N.Y.S.2d 541
(Sup. Ct. Schenectady County 1972); Pennsylvania Gas Co. v. Secord Bros., Inc., 73
Misc. 2d 1031, 343 N.Y.S.2d 256 (Sup. Ct. Chautaugua County 1973); Special Project,
supra note 7, at 176·80.
17 See N.Y.U.C.C. § 2·314 (McKinney 1964). See generally WHITE & SUMMERS,
supra note 7, at 343·57.
18 See N.Y.U.C.C. § 2·315 (McKinney 1964). See generally WHITE & SUMMERS,
supra note 7, at 357-60.
18 See N.Y.U.C.C. § 2·316 (McKinney 1964); notes 20·23 and accompanying text
infra. The policy underlying this section is not to prohibit or discourage disclaimers but
simply to "protect the buyer from surprise." N.Y.U.C.C. § 2·316 comment 1.
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against an implied warranty of merchantability, a disclaimer
must "mention merchantability and in case of a writing must be
conspicuous."2o To exclude an implied warranty of fitness, the
disclaimer must be both in writing and conspicuous.21 Either
warranty also may be disclaimed by language that in common
commercial understanding indicates that the buyer is taking the
goods with no implied warranties.22 A disclaimer meeting these
requirements will be effective notwithstanding the buyer's lack
of knowledge of the disclaimer.23
The meaning of "conspicuousness" is often a central issue in
cases challenging a disclaimer's validity.24 The Code defines the
term to mean language "so written that a reasonable person
against whom it is to operate ought to have noticed it,'J21S and
provides examples of ways in which a clause can be made sufficiently conspicuous, such as printing it entirely in capitals or in
larger or contrasting type.26 It should be emphasized that these
examples are not exhaustive, and the conspicuousness of the disclaimer is always a question of fact for the court.27 It should also
20 N.Y.U.C.C. § 2-316(2) (McKinney 1964). With respect to the requirement that
the disclaimer use the word "merchantability," see Dennin v. Geneml Motors Corp., 78
Mise. 2d 451, 357 N.Y.S.2d 668 (Sup. Ct. Spec. Term Essex County 1974); Stream v.
Sportcar Salon, Ltd., 91 Mise. 2d 99, 397 N.Y.s.2d 677 (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct. 1977).
21 See N.Y.U.C.C. § 2-316(2) (McKinney 1964).
S2 The drafters indicated that language such as "as is" and "with all faults" would
be sufficient to meet this requirement. See ide § 2-316(3)(a) & comment 7. While not
specifically required by the Code, New York courts have assumed that such language
must also be conspicuous to be effective. See Natale V. Martin Volkswagen, Inc., 92 Mise.
2d 1046, 402 N.Y.S.2d 156 (Utica City Ct. 1978); Regan Purchase & Sales Corp. V. Primavera, 68 Mise. 2d 858, 328 N.Y.S.2d 490 (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct. 1972).
S3 See Architectural Aluminum Corp. V. Macarr, Inc., 70 Mise. 2d 495, 498, 333
N.Y.S.2d 818, 822 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1972).
24 See WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 7, at 440-44.
S3 N.Y.U.C.C. § 1-201(10) (McKinney 1964).
28 See ide For a case addressing the "conspicuousness" requirement in the context of
an oral disclaimer, see Regan Purchase & Sales Corp. v. Primavera, 6S Mise. 2d 85S, 328
N.Y.S.2d 490 (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct. 1972) (oral statement by auctioneer that goods are sold
"as is," that was neither repeated nor amplified, did not meet "conspicuousness"
requirement).
27 See N.Y.U.C.C. § 1-201(10). Conspicuousness may be achieved by the we of
"larger or other contrasting type or color," id., but other methods may be equally successful. See, e.g., Architectural Aluminum Corp. V. Macarr, Inc., 70 Mise. 2d 495, 499,
333 N.Y.S.2d 818, 823 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1972) (language separately set forth,
framed with a heavy black line, and surrounded by one inch blank margin). For examples of language not meeting the test, see Nassau Suffolk White Trucks. Ine. V. Twin
County Transit Mix Corp., 62 A.D.2d 982, 983, 403 N.Y.s.2d 322, 325 (2d Dep't 1978)
(clause in print no larger than any other print on entire page and smaller than some),
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be noted that what is required is that the limitation of warranties be made conspicuous; the negative or limiting aspect of the
provision must be reasonably certain to gain the buyer's attention. Thus, a disclaimer might be ineffective if only the comforting term "WARRANTY" is made prominent, though the provision as a whole would restrict the buyer's warranty protection.28
The seller's power to disclaim implied warranties is limited
only by his willingness to comply with the formal requirements
of section 2-316. 29 In contrast, the Code's provision on modification and limitation of remedies, section 2-719,30 sets forth no
guidelines on what a clause must say or how it must appear
other than to require that the clause expressly state that a remedy is exclusive if it is to function as the sole remedy.3t The
Code's approach is to state general approval of provisions creating remedies "in addition to or in substitution for" those already
provided by Article 2,32 but then to introduce a pair of rules

General Elec. Credit Corp. v. Hoey, 7 U.C.C. REP. SERVo (Callaghan) 156, 160 (Sup. Ct.
Kings County 1970) (disclaimer on back of form), and Natale V. Martin Volkswagen,
Inc., 92 Misc. 2d 1046, 1048, 402 N.Y.S.2d 156, 158 (Utica City Ct. 1978) (disclaimer
hand-stamped on printed material making it difficult to read). While language that is not
in some way distinguished from other language in a form contract will usually not be
deemed conspicuous, it may pass the test where the agreement is not a standard form
but is drafted by sophisticated commercial parties. American Elec. Power CO. V. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 418 F. Supp. 435, 451 n.22 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
28 Compare Victor V. Mammana, 101 Misc. 2d 954, 956, 422 N.Y.S.2d 350, 351 (Sup.
Ct. Nassau County 1979) (disclaimer not conspicuous where only "WARRANTY" appeared in large print and disclaimer was in small print and borderless) with Basic Adhesives, Inc. V. Robert Matzkin Co., 101 Misc. 2d 283, 290,420 N.Y.S.2d 983, 987 (N.Y.C.
Civ. Ct. 1979) (disclaimer conspicuous where firat word was "NON-WARRANTY"
printed in capitals). It should be emphasized that a disclaimer meeting the requirements
of § 2-316 will still be ineffective if it is not included as part of the original agreement, as
where it appears on an invoice or owner's manual provided at the time of deliverY. See
WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 7, at 445-46.
•• At least this is what appears from a reading of § 2-316 itself. The doctrine of
unconscionability may come into play and limit the power to disclaim implied warranties. See notes 45-54 and accompanying text infra. It should also be noted that warranties may be effectively excluded or modified under the Code by the buyer's taking the
goods following his examination of them or following his opportunity to examine them
prior to contracting, see N.Y.U.C.C. § 2-316(3)(b) (McKinney 1964), or by trade usage or
custom, see id. § 2-316(2)(c). However, limitations not part of a formal contract are beyond the scope of this Article.
• 0 Id. § 2-719.
.. Id. § 2-719(I)(b). See Stream v_ Sportscar Salon, Ltd., 91 Misc. 2d 99, lOS, 397
N.Y.S.2d 677, 682-83 (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct. 1977).
•• See N.Y.U.C:C. § 2-719(1) (McKinney 1964). The Code specifically gives as exam·
pIes of such allowable modifications "limiting the buyer's remedies to return of the goods
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each of which may limit the substantive effect of any such provision, the overriding purpose being to assure "that at least minimum adequate remedies be available."33
The first such limitation comes into play only at the time a
breach occurs. Section 2-719(2) provides that "[w]here circumstances cause an exclusive or limited remedy to fail of its essential purpose, remedy may be had as provided in this ACt."M Section 2-719(2) is concerned with remedies that fail to achieve
their intended purposes because of unforeseen circumstances
arising at the time of the breach; it is intended to deal with
those cases where at the time of contracting the limiting provision appeared reasonably well suited to fairly and adequately
handle problems that might arise but where the actual difficulty
that does arise is one the clause was not designed to cope with
effectively. This doctrine does not depend on any finding that
the substituted or limited remedy could have been judged to be
and repayment of the price or to repair and replacement of non-conforming goods or
parts." ld.
n ld. comment 1.
u ld. § 2-719(2). A comment explains that "where an apparently fair and reasonable
clause because of circumstances fails in its purpose or operates to deprive either party of
the substantial value of the bargain, it must give way to the general remedy provisions of
••• Article [2]." ld. comment 1. The meaning of this doctrine has been much debated,
see, e.g., Anderson, Failure of Essential Purpose And Essential Failure On Purpose: A
Look At Section 2-719 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 31 Sw. L.J. 759 (1977); Eddy,
On The "Essential" Purposes of Limited Remedies: The Metaphysics of UCC Section
2-719 (2), 65 CALIF. L. REv. 28 (1977). By its very nature, dealing o.s it does with changing and unforeseen circumstances, it is probably not subject to precise definition. An
example, however, may be helpful The classic example of a situation governed by the
"failure of essential purpose" doctrine is found in automobile sales agreements. Such
agreements typically supplement the express warranty with a provision limiting the
buyer's remedy for defects to replacement of the defective parts. The "essentiBl purpose"
of this remedy could be said to be the assurance that the buyer will, with only a minimum of personal inconvenience and delay, have a car free from defect o.s he would reasonably expect when buying a new car. It assumes that such cars may require some minor repair or adjustment before they are truly "as good as new" and that such work can
be expected and should be accepted in the circumstances. If the car is defective in such a
way, or if the seller's attempts to repair are so faulty and unsuccessful that it is still not
in good condition after the dealer has been given some fair chance and amount of time to
repair, the limited remedy of repair or replacement can be said to have failed of its
essential purpose. See WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 7, at 466-67; Anderson, supra, at
767-70; Eddy, supra, at 68-84. In Stream v. Sportscar Salon, Ltd., 91 Mise. 2d 99, 397
N.Y.S.2d 677 (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct. 1977), the court held that a provision for "one repair or
replacement" of a car's engine failed of its essential purpose because the single repair
still left the car with a defective engine. ld. at 106, 397 N.Y.8.2d at 683.
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unfair or oppressive at the time of contracting. 311 Unfortunately,
the leading New York case discussing the "failure of essential
purpose" concept neglected to recognize this crucial distinction.
In Wilson Trading Corp. v. David Ferguson, Ltd.,36 a provision
in a contract for the sale of yarn prohibited the buyer from making claims for defects more than ten days after shipment or after
the yarn had been knitted into garments. The New York Court
of Appeals held that the provision failed of its essential purpose
because some defects would not be "reasonably discoverable"
within this period, thereby leaving the buyer with no remedy.87
However, this difficulty with the remedy limitation should have
been apparent, at least to members of the trade, at the time the
contract was entered into. As the failure of essential purpose
doctrine is intended to police clauses whose inadequacies only
become apparent at the time a breach occurs,88 the Wilson
court's reliance on that doctrine was misplaced.
The second restriction ,imposed by the Code upon the modification or limitation of remedies is specifically directed toward
those provisions that can be judged at their inception to be inequitable. This is the concept of unconscionability as explicitly applied by the Code to questons of limitations or modifications of
remedy. The final subsection of section 2-719 provides:
Consequential damages may be limited or excluded unless the limitation or exclusion is unconscionable. Limitation of consequential damages for injuries to the person in the case of consumer goods is prima
facie unconscionable but limitation of damages where the loss is com-

See WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 7, at 466.
23 N.Y.2d 398, 244 N.E.2d 685, 297 N.Y.S.2d 108 (1968).
I. Id. at 405,244 N.E.2d at 689, 297 N.Y.S.2d at 114.
as See WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 7, at 466; Anderson, supra note 34, at 764·67;
Eddy, supra note 34, at 30-40.
An important question that remains is the range of remedies that a buyer will have
available in the event a substituted remedy is found to have failed in its essential purpose. See Eddy, supra note 34, at 84-92; Special Project, supra note 7, at 234-43. Generally, the buyer is allowed to pursue any of the remedies provided for in the Code. See
WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 7, at 469-70. Some courts have held, however, that a
separate clause excluding any consequential damages will survive the failure of a repair
or replacement provision. See, e.g., American Elec. Power Co., Inc. v. Westinghouse Elee.
Corp., 418 F. Supp. 435 (S.D.N.Y. 1976); County Asphalt, Inc. v. Lewis Welding & Eng'g
Corp., 323 F. Supp. 1300 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), aff'd, 444 F.2d 372 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied,
404 U.S. 939 (1971). But see Erie County Water Auth. v. Hen-Gar Constr. Corp., 473 F.
Supp. 1310, 1315 (W.D.N.Y. 1979) (stating that law in this area is unsettled).
la
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mercia! is not. 39

It must be noted initially that the opening words of this subsection explicitly recognize and approve of the possiblity that limitations of consequential damages may be included in contracts
of sale.40 Where the party seeking damages is a commercial entity such a limitation is easily upheld; although a limitation of
remedy could in theory still be found unconscionable, the instances of such a finding would be rare.U On the other hand, the
section is of great significance in stating that limitation of consequential damages for personal injury in the case of consumer
goods is prima facie unconscionable,42 and only in the exceptional case is this presumption overcome.43
Section 2-719(3) is on its face directly applicable only to
clauses limiting or modifying remedies, not to warranty disclaimers, and then only to clauses that specifically restrict consequential damages.H The reach of the unconscionability doctrine
may, however, exceed the limited scope of section 2-719(3) to
include limitations of remedies other than consequential damage
and general warranty disclaimers. The courts have indicated
that a limited or substituted remedy may fall because of unconscionability, as distinct from failure of its essential purpose, even
when the remedy provided is not primarily directed at the exclusion of consequential damages. Limitations of remedies in general are subject to the cons cion ability review.4G In the case of

.0 N.Y.U.C.C. § 2-719(3) (McKinney 1964). See generally Note, The Enforceability
of Contractual Clauses Excluding Sellers From Liability For Consequential Damages
Under Section 2-719 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 58 WASH. U.L.Q. 317 (1980).
'0 N.Y.U.C.C. § 2-719(3) (McKinney 1964).
n See American Elec. Power Co., Inc. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 418 F. Supp.
435, 458 n.41 (S.D.N.Y. 1976); County Asphalt, Inc. v. Lewis Welding & Eng'g Corp., 323
F. Supp. 1300, 1308 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), a/f'd, 444 F.2d 372 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404
U.S. 939 (1971); Bakal v. Burroughs Corp., 74 Misc. 2d 202, 343 N.Y.5.2d 541 (Sup. Ct.
Schenectady County 1972)•
•• N.Y.U.C.C. § 2-719(3) (McKinney 1964)•
•• See WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 7, at 482 n.234. A New York court recently
held that a limitation of consequential damages as applied to property loss in the case of
a consumer product was unconscionable. See Fischer v. Gen. Elec. Hotpoint, 108 Mise.
2d 683, 438 N.Y.S.2d 690 (Dist. Ct. Suffolk County 1981)•
.. See N.Y.U.C.C. § 2-719(3) (McKinney 1964)•
•• See Stream v. Sportscar Salon, Ltd., 91 Misc.2d 99, 397 N.Y.5.2d 677 (N.Y.C. Civ.
Ct. 1977) (limitation of remedy to one repair or replacement "might very weU" be unconscionable). Subjecting limitations to the conscionability test has the approval of the
Court of Appeals, which has said that "contractual limitations upon remedies are gener-
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clauses worded as warranty disclaimers, two approaches have
been taken. First, section 2-719(3) has itself been held applicable
to warranty disclaimers that have the effect of denying consequential damages. In Walsh v. Ford Motor CO.,"6 a New York
trial court held the defendant's disclaimer of implied warranties
unconscionable under section 2-719(3) because his express warranty left the plaintiff with no remedy for personal injuries.""
Conceding that the disclaimer met the formal requirements of
section 2-316,48 the court nonetheless regarded it as essentially a
limitation of remedies provision and thus subject to the unconscionability standard of section 2-719(3).49
Warranty disclaimers may also be subject to scrutiny under
the Code's general unconscionability provision, section 2-302. GO
Because warranty disclaimers are governed by the specific requirements set forth in section 2-316,lSI the question arises
whether disclaimers meeting these requirements are exempted
from scrutiny under section 2-302, which expressly extends the
unconscionability standard to "any clause of the contract
• • • • "1S2 The applicability of section 2-302 to disclaimers otherwise valid under section 2-316 is a hotly debated question and is
as yet unresolved.lSs New York cases, however, generally support
the view that warranty disclaimers must withstand attack under
both Code sections.1S4

ally to be enforced unless unconscionable." Wilson Trading Corp. v. David Ferguson,
Ltd., 23 N.Y. 398, 403, 244 N.E.2d 685, 687, 297 N.Y.S.2d 108, 112 (1968) •
•• 59 Misc. 2d 241, 298 N.Y.S.2d 538 (Sup. Ct. Special Term Nassau County 1969).
'7 ld. at 242, 298 N.Y.S.2d at 540.
.. ld.
•• ld. White and Summers criticize this approach as inconsistent with the overall
scheme of the Code. See WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 7, at 483·84•
•• N.Y.U.C.C. § 2-302 (McKinney 1964). Section 2-302 permits a court to refuse to
enforce a contract if the contract or any clause thereof is found to be unconscionable at
the time it was made. ld. The court may also delete the unconscionable clause or limit its
application to preclude an unconscionable result. ld.
•, See notes 18-23 and accompanying text supra•
•• N.Y.U.C.C. § 2-302 (McKinney 1964). See Left', Unconscionability and the Code
- The Emperor's New Clause, 115 U. PA. L. REv. 485, 516-28 (1967); WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 7, at 475-81.
•• See WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 7, at 475-81 •
.. See Industralease Automated & Scientific Equip. Corp. v. R.M.E. Enters., Inc., 58
A.D.2d 482, 396 N.Y.S.2d 427 (2d Dep't 1977); Sarfati v. M.A. Hittner & Sons, Inc., 35
A.D.2d 1004, 318 N.Y.S.2d 352 (2d Dep't 1970), afl'd, 30 N.Y.2d 613, 282 N.E.2d 126, 331
N.Y.S.2d 40 (1972).

1982]

n.

CONTRACTUAL DISCLAIMER

11

PRODUCTS LIABILITY

From the task of interpretation and application of a complex, comprehensive, and much considered Code, we turn to an
area that has developed in a far less organized fashion. The part
that an attempted exculpatory clause in a contract will play in
an action brought under the theory (or theories) of products liability is open to question because of the uncertain quality of
that field of law in New York.1I11 It is well-established in' New
York that an action based on a defective product may proceed
on one or more of the theories of breach of warranty, strict liability in tort, or negligence.liS The nature of each cause of action
and the manner in which the causes of action interrelate is far
from clear.1I7 Under section 2-318 of the Code, recovery under a
breach of warranty theory is not limited to immediate purchasers; both remote purchasers and third parties are entitled t~ the
benefits of the seller's warranties, express or implied.lls However,
these persons are no less subject to valid warranty disclaimers
and remedy limitations than are immediate purchasers. The
~ Attempts are now underway, however, to systematize and codify the law of products liability. See generally 9 PROD. SAFETY LIAB. REP. (BNA) 797, 797-808 (1981) (draft
of proposed uniform national products liability law).
M See Lancaster Silo & Block Co. v. Northern Propane Gas Co., 75 A.D.2d 55, 427
N.Y.S.2d 1009 (4th Dep't 1980).
"' For example, dictum in Martin v. Julius Dierck Equip. Co., 43 N.Y.2d 583, 374
N.E.2d 97, 403 N.Y.S.2d 185 (1978), suggests that a plaintiff seeking recovery for injury
caused by a defective product may be limited to proceeding on a tort liability basis and
may be barred from bringing an action based on warranty theory. See Howard & Watkins, Strict Products Liability in New York and the Merging of Contract and Tort, 42
ALB. L. REv. 603, 608·09 (1978). This observation was made in spite of the fact that § 2318 of the Code expressly extends warranty protection to all persons who might be "affected by" a manufacturer's defective product. See N.Y.U.C.C. § 2·318 (McKinney Supp.
1981-1982); Donnelly & Donnelly, 1975 Survey of New York Law: Commercial Law, 27
SYRACUSE L. REv. 277, 279 (1975). Whatever power the courts mny have to extend the
doctrine of strict liability in tort, the plaintiff's right to proceed on a contractual warranty theory as provided for in the Code would appear safe from judicial contraction or
modification. See Atkinson v. Ormont Machine Co., Inc., 102 Misc. 2d 468, 423 N.y.s.2d
577 (Sup. Ct. Special Term Kings County 1979); Note, Products Liability in New York:
Section 2·318 of the U.C.C. - The Amendment Without a Cause, 50 FORDHAM L. REv.
61 {1981}.
M See N.Y.U.C.C. § 2·318 (McKinney Supp. 1981-1982); note 57 supra. Section 2318 provides that:
A seller's warranty whether express of implied extends to any natural per.
son if it is reasonable to expect that such person may use, consume or be affected by the goods and who is injured in person by breach of the warranty. A
seller may not exclude or limit the operation of this section.
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drafters made clear their intention to give remote plaintiffs no
greater protection than that enjoyed by those to whom warranties are initially given.1\9
The effectiveness of exculpatory clauses against claims
based on strict liability in tort is quite another matter. As strict
liability in tort emerged partly as a response to the harshness of
applying contract formalities in such situations, most courts and
commentators take the position that attempted disclaimers or
limitations of liability are ineffective against all potential plaintiffs.sO Unfortunately, the development of the doctrine of strict
liability in New York has not been this straightforward. The
New York courts have left many questions regarding strict liability unresolved, including the effect of a contractual disclaimer
of liability.s1 This confusion, and the possibility that such a disclaimer may have far greater effect in New York than in many
other jurisdictions, is traceabl~ to the New York Court of Appeals' decision in Velez v. Craine & Clark Lumber Corp.6Z
Velez, decided shortly after the Court of Appeals' approval
of a separate tort theory of recovery in Codling v. Paglia,SS directly addressed the validity of an otherwise effective warranty
disclaimer in an action based on a strict liability theory. The
Velez plaintiffs, injured after the collapse of a defective scaffold
plank bought by their employer,S4 sued the lumber company,

•• The Code speaks of "extending" warranty protection to persons other than the
immediate purchaser. N.Y.U.C.C. § 2-318 (McKinney Supp. 1981-1982). A comment to §
2-318 explains that "[t]o the extent that the contract of sale contains provisions under
which warranties are excluded or modified, or remedies for breach are limited, such provisions are equally operative against beneficiaries of warranties under this section." Id.
comment 1 (McKinney 1964). The same result was reached with no reference to this
Code section in Icelandic Airlines, Inc. v. Canadair, Ltd., 104 Misc. 2d 239, 428 N.Y.S.2d
393 (Sup. Ct. New York County 1980).
•• See McNichols, Who Says That Strict Tort Disclaimers Can Never Be Effective?
The Courts Cannot Agree, 28 OKLA. L. REV. 494, 494-95 (1975).
•• This is in part due to the Court of Appeals' refusal to adopt § 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts. See Howard & Watkins, supra note 56, at 610-17. Section
402A sets forth the Restatement's substantive criteria for bringing a cause of action in
strict tort liability. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965) (Restatement).
Comment M to this section expressly states that "[t]he consumer's cause of action ••• is
not affected by any disclaimer or other agreement, whether it be between the seller and
his immediate buyer" or otherwise. Id. comment M .
•• 33 N.Y.2d 117, 305 N.E.2d 750, 350 N.Y.S.2d 617 (1973) .
• s 32 N.Y.2d 330, 298 N.E.2d 622, 345 N.Y.S.2d 461 (1973). See Howard & Watkins,
supra note 56, at 605-06.
S< 33 N.Y.2d at 119-20, 305 N.E.2d at 751, 350 N.Y.S.2d at 618.

1982]

CONTRACTUAL DISCLAIMER

13

limiting their legal theories to negligence and breach of warranty65 presumably because the strict liability doctrine had not
been adopted in New York at the time of the commencement of
their action. The trial court dismissed the negligence count, but
the jury awarded substantial damages on the breach of warranty
theory.66 The Appellate Division found that "the only serious
question presented" was the effect to be given a disclaimer that
appeared on the seller's invoice.67 The trial court had held that
the disclaimer was not sufficiently conspicuous under section 2316,68 but the Appellate Division found otherwise holding that
"the disclaimer of warranty was effective against plaintiff's employer Nasso and thus effectively barred plaintiff's action for
breach of warranty."89
The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded the case for a
new trial in light of its decision in Codling.70 The court then discussed the effect to be given the disclaimer under a strict liability theory, assuming for the purposes of its discussion that the
clause met the formal requirements of the Code.71 The court
first considered the Code, but concluded that it did not provide
any guidance as to what parties are bound by valid warranty disclaimers and remedy limitations.72 Finding itself "thrown back
ld. at 120, 305 N.E.2d at 751, 350 N.Y.s.2d at 619.
ld. The verdict was apparently based upon a finding of a breach of the warranty
of fitness for a particular purpose, 8pecifically, that the lumber was unsuitable for scaffolding. See Velez v. Craine & Clark Lumber Co., 68 Mise. 2d 499, 500, 326 N.Y.s.2d 928,
929-30 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1971), reu'd, 4LA.D.2d 747, 341 N.Y.s.2d 248 (2d Dep't
1973).
67 Velez v. Craine & Clark Lumber Co., 41 A.D.2d 747, 748, 341 N.Y.s.2d 248, 251
(2d Dep't 1973).
68 68 Mise. 2d at 502, 326 N.Y.S.2d at 931.
e. 41 A.D.2d at 749, 341 N.Y.S.2d at 252.
The dissent would have sustained the plaint.ifr8 recovery under an independent
strict liability theory like that which was later adopted by the Court of Appeals in Codling. See note 63 and accompanying text supra. The dissent emphasized that as strict
liability derives from tort principles, the rights of remote users should not "be cut off by
concessions made by the immediate purchaser." 41 A.D.2d at 750, 341 N.Y.S.2d at 254.
70 33 N.Y.2d at 121, 305 N.E.2d at 752, 350 N.Y.S.2d at 620. The trial court was
instructed to consider those issues that had not been originally addressed but had since
become relevant because of the availability of the separate strict liability theory.
711d. at 124, 305 N.E.2d at 753-54, 350 N.Y.s.2d at 622-23. See notes 18-23 and
accompanying text supra.
'Z2 The court noted that § 2-316, which governs warranty disclaimers, "does not undertake, nor does any other section of the Code undertake, to specify who shall and who
shall not be bound by an exclusion of warranties." 33 N.Y.2d at 124, 305 N.E.2d at 754,
350 N.Y.S.2d at 622. As noted previously, comment 1 to § 2-318 indicates that remote
u
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on broad principles of contract law,"73 the court saw no reason
to prohibit limitations of liability between the immediate parties
to a contract even though the cause of action itself sounded in
tort rather than contract.74 But where, as in Velez, the plaintiff
was a stranger to the contract without notice of the disclaimer
he will not be bound by its terms. "[I]n the absence of special
circumstances," the court held, "buyer and seller cannot contract to limit the seller's exposure under strict products liability
to an innocent user or bystander."7G It is hard to criticize a rule
that exempts strangers to a contract from its limitations, particularly when suit is brought not on the contract itself but on a
separate tort doctrine. 76 One wonders, however, what "special
circumstances" would change this result. The court seemed to
suggest that actual notice of the disclaimer would be sufficient.77
Whether this should bind plaintiffs that are powerless to affect
the contractual relationship is open to question. As the facts in
Velez illustrate, the notion that such plaintiffs "assume the risk"
by using a product with knowledge of a disclaimer is trouble-

users and third parties are to receive no greater protection than that accorded to imme·
diate purchasers, and therefore are subject to valid disclaimers under the Code. See note
59 supra. The court overlooked this comment in reaching its decision.
At the time Velez was decided § 2·318 was not in its present form but extended its
warranty protection only to "any natural person who is in the family or household" of
the buyer "or who is a guest in his home." N.Y.U.C.C. § 2·318 (McKinney 1964). Thus
the plaintiffs, as employees of the buyer, would not have been covered by the section.
Their reliance on a warranty theory, and the acceptance of that theory at the trial level,
reflected the common law expansion of the cause of action for breach of warranty beyond
the bounds provided by the Code as a matter of statutory right. Perhaps this is the
explanation for the troublesome remark of the Court of Appeals in Martin, supra note
57, which suggests, contrary to the plain language of § 2·318, that breach of warranty is
no longer available to a consumer who lacks privity of contract. The court may wish to
be taken as saying only that the extension of the contractual action as a matter of com·
mon law to cases outside the limits set forth in the Code, which had preceeded its adop·
tion of strict liability in tort, had been rendered superfluous by that tort doctrine and
could be abandoned.
1S 33 N.Y.2d at 124, 305 N.E.2d at 754, 350 N.Y.S.2d at 623.
14 Id. at 125, 305 N.E.2d at 754, 350 N.Y.S.2d at 623 •
•• Id.
•• An interesting variant is provided by John R. Dudley Constr., Inc. v. Drott Mfg.
Co., 66 A.D.2d 368, 412 N.Y.S.2d 512 (4th Dep't 1979), holding that a disclaimer of war·
ranty and an "as is" provision in the purchase contract between the plaintiff and his
immediate seller could not bar a liability action against the product's manufacturer, at
least where there was no suggestion that the seller intended disclaimers to benefit the
manufacturer.
•• 33 N.Y.2d at 125, 305 N.E.2d at 754, 350 N.Y.S.2d at 623.
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some. Had the plaintiffs been fully aware of the warranty disclaimer on the lumber, they can hardly be said to have assumed
the risk of its being defective simply because they did not refuse
to use the scaffold.
Even more troublesome is the court's seeming approval of
disclaimers in the context of a suit by a buyer against his immediate seIler.'1S If this dictum develops into a rule giving effect to
disclaimers only in cases brought by a buyer against his immediate seller where the disclaimer was actually bargained for by the
parties in a sophisticated commercial setting, New York law may
not be radically different from the law of strict liability as it has
evolved elsewhere.'19 But if New York law is seen as protecting
the seller, even in the consumer context,SD whenever a carefully
worded and displayed disclaimer is used, strict products liability
in New York could have a much different scope than in other
jurisdictions. Its principal effect might only be to impress upon
manufacturers and sellers of consumer products the need to
draft even longer and more protective disclaimer language.
III.

STATUTORY PROHIBITIONS IN PARTICULAR CASES

Standing alongside the comprehensive scheme governing the
sale of goods under the Code and the evolving common law rules
?I The court stated that "[a]lthough strict products liability sounds in tort rather
than in contract, we see no reason why in the absence of some consideration of public
policy parties cannot by contract restrict or modify what would otherwise be a liability
••• grounded in tort." ld. at 124-25, 305 N.E.2d at 754, 350 N.Y.s.2d at 623. The court
did not suggest what policy considerations might limit the parties' right to disclaim lia·
bility. Commentators have read this dictum as a rejection of the position, taken in the
comment to § 402A of the Restatement, see note 61 supra, that disclaimers are completely irrelevant in the strict liability context. See McNichols, supra note 60, at 512-13.
The possible role of "policy considerations" renders this judgment somewhat premnture,
and the precise meaning of the Velez dictum must await further elaboration by the
courts.
?t Even those jurisdictions that have adopted section 402A of the Restatement have
shown a willingness to uphold disclaimers negotiated in a commercial context, at least
where the provision is clearly worded so as to disclaim strict tort liability. See, e.g., Delta
Airlines, Inc. v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 503 F.2d 239 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421
U.S. 965 (1975); Keystone Aeronautics Corp., v. R. J. Enstrom Corp., 499 F.2d 146 (3d
eir. 1974); McNichols, supra note 60, at 505·13.
10 In his concurrence in Victorson v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 37 N.Y.2d 395, 407
n.2, 335 N.E.2d 275,281 n.2, 373 N.Y.s.2d 39, 47 n.2 (1975), Judge Fuchsberg stated that
"[i]n Velez • •• this court indicated that disclaimers negotiated by a consumer might
well be valid under proper circumstances." See generally Tv.-erski, From Codling, to
Balm to Velez: Triptych of Confusion, 2 HOFSTRA L. REv. 489 (1974).
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in the area of products liability, New York has adopted, beginning in 1937, a series of statutes prohibiting the disclaimer of
liability for negligence in certain situations. The first of these
statutes to be adopted, now found in section 5-321 of the General Obligations Law (GOL),81 changed the New York common
law rule82 by making unenforceable any disclaimer by the lessor
of liability for his negligence or that of his employees in a lease
of real property. Judicial construction has given the statute a
broad application. A landlord may not, under the statute, defend a negligence action by relying upon a lease provision requiring that the lessee give written notice of defects. 8s Neither
may he rely upon a provision that the lessee indemnify him for
the lessee's injuries arising out of the lessor's negligence. 8 " However, additional defenses given the landlord will not be invalidated simply because they appear in the same paragraph as the
illegal exculpatory clause.81S

., N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 5-321 (McKinney 1978). Section 5-321 provides that:
Every covenant, agreement or understanding in or in connection with or
collateral to any lease of real property exempting the lessor from liability for
damages for injuries to person or property caused by or resulting from the negligence of the lessor, his agents, servants or employees, in the operation or
maintenance of the demised premises or the real property containing the demised premises shall be deemed to be void as against public policy and wholly
unenforceable•
• 2 See Bernard Kat2, Inc. v. East 30th Street Corp., 172 Misc. 873, 16 N.Y.S.2d 640
(Sup. Ct. Special Term New York County 1939), aff'd, 259 A.D. 707, 19 N.Y.S.2d 145
(1940); Hanfeld v. A. Broido, Inc., 167 Misc. 85, 3 N.Y.S.2d 463 (N.Y. Mun. Ct. 1938).
This section's constitutionality was upheld in Billie Knitwear Inc. v. New York Life Ins.
Co., 174 Misc. 978, 22 N.Y.S.2d 324 (Sup.Ct. Special Term N.Y. County 1940), afT'd, 262
A.D. 714, 27 N.Y.S.2d 328 (1st Dep't 1941), aff'd, 288 N.Y. 682, 43 N.E.2d 80 (1942) •
•• See Kean v. 34 West 34th Street Corp., 190 Misc. 914, 75 N.Y.S.2d 498 (Sup. Ct.
N.Y. County 1947); Gordon v. McMee, 184 Misc. 469, 54 N.Y.S.2d 443 (N.Y.C. Civil Ct.
1945), modified on other grounds, 186 Misc. 132, 61 N.Y.S.2d 635 (Sup. Ct. App. Term
1st Dep't 1945).
.. "[The lessor] cannot choose a circuitous method to do indirectly what it cannot
accomplish directly. It cannot expose itself to liability to the lessee, yet require that if
liability be proved the lessee must repay any recovery under the terms of an indemnity
clause in the lease." Redding v. Gulf Oil Corp., 38 A.D.2d 850, 851, 330 N.Y.S.2d 158, 161
(2d Dep't 1972).
The statute has also been held applicable to cases involving the lessor's passive negligence. See International Underwear Corp. v. Brooklyn Trust Co., 287 N.Y. 589, 38
N.E.2d 386 (1941); Palanker v. Edwards Properties, Inc., 32 Misc. 2d 772, 222 N.Y.S.2d
266 (Sup. Ct. Erie County 1961); Bullock v. Sinclair Ref. Co., 164 N.Y.S.2d 452 (Sup. Ct.
Oneida County 1956).
sa See Gislason v. Willard Realty Corp., 14 A.D.2d 740, 220 N.Y.S.2d 108 (1st Dep't
1961) (tenant's breach of provision limiting items stored with lessor to empty trunks

1982]

CONTRACTUAL DISCLAIMER

17

A second statute, adopted in 1949, GOL 5-325,86 prohibits
garage owners and parking lot operators from disclaiming liability for personal injuries or property damage resulting from their
negligence. This section does not, of course, render the parking
garage liable as an insurer of cars parked at its facility.87 Liability depends in the first instance upon whether the relationship
between the garage owner and the vehicle owner is that of a
bailment or only that of a license for use of the spacejSS only in
the bailment situation does the statutory prohibition of liability
disclaimers become applicable.89 Section 5-325 does not prevent
the parties from creating a licensing relationship, the result of
which will be to lower the garage's duty of care.90 However, once
a bailment is found the statute voids any attempt to exempt or
limit91 the bailor's liability, regardless of whether the exemption
is presented on the ticket provided by the garage or set forth in

absolved lessor of liability for damage to contents, despite invalidity of provision generally exempting him from liability for damage to articles stored in his storeroom).
In addition, the statute will not invalidate provisions requiring that the parties carry
their own insurance and limiting their recovery to the amount of the insurance coverage
with no right of subrogation. See Brentano's Inc. v. Charter M!lIlBgement Corp., 46
A.D.2d 861, 361 N.Y.S.2d 665 (1st Dep't 1974).
88 N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 5·325 (McKinney 1978). The statute requires that the
storage or repair be "for hire or other consideration." ld. This requirement is met where
parking is just one of a "totality of. • • services" provided by a hotel for a single fee. See
Mindlin v. Kiamesha Concord, Inc., 31 A.D.2d 988, 988, 297 N.y.s.2d 1008, 1010-11 (ad
Dep't 1969). The statute applies to garages operating on properties owned by the Port of
New York Authority. Nargi v. Parking Assoc. Corp., 36 Misc. 2d 836, 234 N.Y.s.2d 42
(N.Y.C. Civ. Ct. 1962); Continental Ins. Co. V. Meyer Bros. Operations, Inc., 56 Mise. 2d
435, 288 N.Y.S.2d 756 (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct. 1968). See generally Freedman, Voidance of
Agreements Exempting New York Garages and Parking Places From Liability For Negligence, 18 FORDHAM L. REv. 261 (1949).
87 See Rudolph V. Riverdale Management, 202 Misc. 586, 113 N.y.s.2d 524 (N.Y.C.
Mun. Ct. 1952).
sa See Motors Ins. Corp. V. American Garages, Inc., 98 Misc. 2d 887, 889, 414
N.Y.S.2d 841, 842 (Sup. Ct. App. Term 1st Dep't 1979); 25 N.Y. JURe Garages, Filling
and Parking Stations § 36 (1962).
" See Horowitz V. Ambassador Assoc., Inc., 108 Misc. 2d 412,415,437 N.y.s.2d 608,
610·11 (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct. 1981); Rudolph V. Riverdale Management, Inc., 202 Mise. 586,
113 N.Y.S.2d 514 (N.Y.C. Mun. Ct. 1952).
80 See Rembert V. Co.op City Parking Garage, 86 Misc. 2d 399, 400, 381 N.Y.s.2d
160, 161 (Sup. Ct. App. Term 1st Dep't 1975); Langenthal v. American Stuyvesant Garage, 72 Misc. 2d 189, 338 N.Y.S.2d 727 (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct. 1972).
01 An attempt to limit liability for negligence to $100 unless the car owner paid a
greater amount, equal to the cost of theft insurance, was held "tantamount to an exemption" and contrary to section 5·325 in Motors Ins. Corp. V. American Garages, Inc., 98
Misc. 2d 887, 891, 414 N.Y.S.2d 841, 843-44 (Sup. Ct. App. Term 1st Dep't 1979).
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a sign on the premises. 92 It makes no difference that the vehicle
owner was aware of the disclaimer at the time he parked the
car. 9S
The New York Real Property Law (RPL) was amended in
1953 to prohibit clauses in contracts "affecting real property"
that exempted building contractors from liability resulting from
their negligence in the course of "work performed or services
rendered in connection with construction, maintenance and repair of real property or its appurten~ces."9. Legislative history
suggests that this amendment, presently codified as GOL 5323,91S was enacted in response to the inclusion of exculpatory
clauses in various appliance service and maintenance contracts.90
The question then arose in the mid-1970s whether the statute
was limited to maintenance contracts or encompassed general
construction contracts as well.9? In 1975, more than twenty years
after the amendment of the RPL, the legislature enacted GOL
5-322.1,98 which explicitly extended this prohibition to general
construction contracts. Four years later, the New York Court of
Appeals, addressing what was by then primarily an academic is-

•• See Continental Ins. Co. v. Meyer Bros. Operations, Inc., 56 Misc. 2d 435, 439,
288 N.Y.S.2d 756, 760 (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct. 1968); Makower v. Kinney System, 65 Misc. 2d
808, 811, 318 N.Y.S.2d 515, 518 (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct. 1970). As to the effect of the statute on
the liability, if any, which the garage owner may have for the insurance of personal property taken from a parked car, see General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Grafinger, 61
Misc. 2d 670, 672, 306 N.Y.S.2d 606, 608-09 (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct. 1969).
•• See Continental Ins. Co. v. Meyer Bros. Operations, Inc., 56 Misc. 2d 435, 438,
288 N.Y.S.2d 756, 760 (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct. 1968); Nargi v. Parking Assoc. Corp., 36 Misc. 2d
836, 234 N.Y.S.2d 42 (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct. 1962)•
.. See 1953 N.Y. Laws ch. 716.
•• N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 5-323 (McKinney 1978). Section 5-323 is not violated by
contractual provisions that require one party to provide insurance covering all parties
and to look only to the proceeds for relief, at least in the absence of overreaching or
unconscionability. See Board of Educ., Union Free School Dist. No.3 v. Vaiden Assoc.,
46 N.Y.2d 653, 389 N.E.2d 798, 416 N.Y.S.2d 202 (1979).
A separate statute, GOL § 5-324, renders void any agreements under which an architect, engineer or surveyor is indemnified for damages to person or property arising out of
defects in his work. See N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 5-324 (McKinney 1978).
9G See St. Vincent's Medical Center v. Vincent E. Iorio, Inc., 78 Misc. 2d 968, 970,
358 N.Y.S.2d 993, 996-97 (Sup. Ct. Richmond County 1974)•
.., Compare St. Vincent's Medical Center v. Vincent E. Iorio, Inc., 78 Misc. 2d 968,
970-71,358 N.Y.S.2d 993, 996-97 (Sup. Ct. Richmond County 1974) with Board of Education, Utica School Dist. No.1 v. Cese, 65 Mise. 2d 473, 477, 318 N.Y.S.2d 46, 50 (Sup.
Ct. Oneida County 1971).
o. See 1975 N.Y. Laws ch. 408, § 1 (codified as amended at N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW §
5-322.1 (McKinney 1978 & Supp. 1981-1982».
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sue,99 announced that GOL 5-323 itself banned exculpatory
clauses in general construction contracts. IOO
Two other sections of the GOL similarly prohibit disclaimers of liability for negligence in situations where the interest in
protecting the public is particularly strong and the likelihood of
individual bargaining is particularly weak. GOL 5_322101 prohibits caterers and catering establishments from contracting away
their duty of care.102 Lastly, GOL 5-326,103 added in 1976, prohibits exemptions from liability for negligence in contracts,
membership applications, admissions tickets or similar writings
entered into for a fee between the owner of "any pool, gymnasium, place of amusement or recreation, or similar establishment
and the user of such facilities. UlM
IV.

PUBLIC SERVICE AND QUASI-PUBLIC SERVICE PROVIDERS

The concern for fairness has a special significance when a
public service corporationloli claims an exemption from negligence liability as part of its tariff or rate schedule filed with the
" The addition of § 5-322.1 did not render the question berore the court moot because the statute was expressly limited to agreements entered into on or ruter August 7,
1975. See N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAw § 5-322.1(2) (McKinney 1978).
100 See Board of EdUc., Union Free School Dist. No. 3 v. Vnlden Assoc., Inc., 46
N.Y.2d 653, 656, 389 N.E.2d 798, 799, 416 N.Y.S.2d 202, 203 (1979).
101 N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAw § 5-322 (McKinney 1978).
102 See Goodman v. Imperion Manor, 62 Misc. 2d 561, 563-64, 309 N.y.s.2d 287, 289
(N.Y.C. Civ. Ct. 1970), aff'd, 64 Misc. 2d 813, 316 N.Y.S.2d 152 (App. Term. 2d App.
Term 2d Dep't 1970).
103 N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAw § 5-326 (McKinney 1978).
104 This statute was apparently intended to deal with the result of the Court or Appeals decision in Ciofalo v. Vic Tanney Gyms, Inc., 10 N.Y.2d 294,177 N.E.2d 925, 220
N.Y.S.2d 962 (1961), and sinillar cases that upheld such disclaimers on common Jaw
principles. See Beardslee v. Blomberg, 70 A.D.2d 732, 733-34, 416 N.y.s.2d 855, 857-58
(1979) (Kane, J. & Mikoll, J., concurring separately). In Beardslee, a divided Appellate
Division held that the statute was not applicable to a release signed by the plaintiff who,
after she had gained admission to an auto race track, had responded to a cnll for participants in a "Powder Puff Derby." A majority of the Appellate Division concluded that the
separate release signed at this time was not an agreement "in or in connection v.ith" her
ticket of admission. ld. at 733, 416 N.Y.S.2d at 857.
10. The term "public service corporation" rerers to the various utilities and common
carriers subject to regulation under the New York Public Service Law. See, e.g., N.Y.
PUB. SERVo LAw § 2(3) (McKinney 1955 & Supp. 1981-1982) (defining "corporation"); id.
§ 2(11) (defining "gas corporation"); id. § 2(13) (defining "electric corporation"); id. §
2(17) (defining "telephone corporation"); id. § 2(19) (defining "telegraph corporation',);
id. §2(22) (defining "steanI corporation"); id. §2(27) (defining "water works
corporation").
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Public Service Commission. lOB While the relationship between
the utility and its customers is considered contractual in nature,107 the individual customer is not free to bargain over any
disclaimer clause;108 in fact, he is unlikely to be aware of it. Accordingly, our dissatisfaction with limitations of liability in
"contracts of adhesion" is particularly strong in this context. At
the same time, a utility's potential liability as a result of an interruption of service could be staggering. Since the utility's rates
are not a matter of free contract but are administratively established, not to allow the utility some protection from liability
would presumably be reflected in generally higher rates. l09
These conflicting pressures are evident in Lee v. Consolidated Edison CO.,110 a case arising out of the 1977 New York
City blackout. The plaintiffs, customers of the defendant Consolidated Edison (Con Ed) and workers who suffered lost wages
because of the blackout, brought a small claims action against
the utility.lll Although the Civil Court found "no legal relationship between the wage earners and Con Ed upon which relief
could be based,"1l2 it held that the utility could be held liable to
its customers for damages caused by the interruption in service.ll3 Con Ed's main defense was based on an exculpatory
clause in its rate schedule, which provided that "in case the supply of service shall be interrupted or irregular or defective or fail

108 Utilities and common carriers are required to file rate schedules, including all
rules and regulations related to rates, with the Public Service Commission. See, e.g., id. §
66(1) (gas and electric utilities); id. § 92(1) (telephone and telegraph companies).
10'1 See Lee v. Consolidated Edison Co., 95 Misc. 2d 120, 128,407 N.Y.S.2d 777, 783
(N.Y.C. Civ. Ct.), rev'd on other grounds, 98 Misc. 2d 304, 413 N.Y.S.2d 826 (Sup. Ct.
App. Term 1st Dep't 1978).
108 Once a tariff schedule is accepted by the Public Service Commission, neither the
Commission nor the consumer can depart from a limitation of liability provision appearing in the schedule. See Lee v. Consolidated Edison Co., 98 Misc. 2d 304, 306, 413
N.Y.S.2d 826, 828 (Sup. Ct. App. Term 1st Dep't 1978).
I~ In a case often cited by the New York courts, the United States Supreme Court
characterized the limitation of liability in such situations to be "an inherent part of the
rate." Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Esteve Bros. & Co., 256 U.S. 566, 571 (1921). See
Abraham v. New York Tel. Co., 85 Misc. 2d 677, 680, 380 N.Y.S.2d 969, 972 (N.Y. Civ.
Ct. N.Y. County 1976).
110 95 Misc. 2d 120,407 N.Y.S.2d 777 (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct.), rev'd, 98 Misc. 2d 304, 413
N.Y.S.2d 826 (Sup. Ct. App. Term 1st Dep't 1978).
111 Id. at 123, 407 N.Y.S.2d at 780.
mId. at 132, 407 N.Y.S.2d at 786 (relying on Beck v. FMC Corp., 42 N.Y.2d 1027,
369 N.E.2d 10 (1977».
113 Id. at 138, 407 N.Y.S.2d at 790.
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from causes beyond its control or through ordinary negligence of
employees, servants, or agents the Company will not be liable
therefor."ll4 The court found that Con Ed's negligence had been
established on the basis of certain reports on the blackout, as
well as on the theory of res ipsa 10quitor. l1II Stating that the effect of an exculpatory clause in a public service corporation's
tariff was an open question,116 the court declined to enforce the
exculpatory clause in Con Ed's tariff as against public policy.117
The Appellate Term reversed, noting that limitations of liability are "an inherent part of the rate-making process."us Once
accepted by the Commission, in the court's view, a tariff "takes
on the force and effect of law and governs every aspect of the
utility's rate and practices."us The court rejected the public policy argument, noting that "similar provisions have been repeatedly sustained by the appellate courts of this State as reasonable
limitations on the liability of a public service corporation, so
long as the company has not attempted to absolve itself from its
own willful misconduct or gross negligence."12o This result has

lU ldo at 132, 407 NoYoS02d at 7860 However, the tariff expressly acknowledged the
company's liability for gross negligence or willful misconduct. Also, ns the trial court
noted, a subsequent portion of the tariff provided that the company (Could be liable for
damage caused by its negligence "resulting in any way Crom the supply or use of electric·
ity or from the presence or operation of the Company's structures, equipment, wires,
p~pes, appliance or devices on the Customer's premises." ldo at 133, 407 N.Y.s.2d at 785.
It seems this second provision was meant to deal with a different situation than interruption of services as in a black-out, but the trial court read the two clauses tOciether as
creating doubt as to their effect and held that the first clause, on which Con Ed relied,
was void for ambiguity. ldo, 407 N.Y.S.2d at 787. The Appellate Term, in reversing this
decision, made no mention of this point.
no ldo at 127, 407 N.Y.S02d at 782. Although the court held that gross negligence
was not established, id. at 128, 407 N.Y.S. 2d at 783, in at least one case arising out of
the same black-out an opposite conclusion was reached. See Food Pageant, Ine. v. Consolidated Edison Co., 54 N.Y.2d 167, 445 N.Y.So2d 60 (1981).
118 95 Mise. 2d at 129, 407 N.Y.S.2d at 784 (citing Wazalen v. Consolidated Edison
Coo, 43 A.D.2d 985, 352 N.Y.S.2d 1014 (2d Deptt 1974». The court did acknowledge however, see ido at 131, 407 N.Y.S.2d at 785, that other courts had decided in favor of the
enforceability of this type of exculpatory clause, see id. See also Devers v. Long Island
Lighting Co., 79 Mise. 2d 165, 359 N.Y.S.2d 940 (Sup. Ct. App. Term 2d Dep't 1974);
Newman v. Consolidated Edison Coo, 79 Mise. 2d 153, 360 N.Y.S.2d 141 (Sup. Ct. App.
Term 2d Dep't 1973).
117 95 Mise. 2d at 138, 407 N.Y.S.2d at 790.
UI 98 Mise. 2d 304, 305, 413 N.Y.S.2d 826, 828 (Sup. Ct. App. Term 1st Dep't 1978).
111 ldo at 305, 413 N.Y.S.2d at 828.
I •• ldo at 306, 413 N.Y.S02d at 828.
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been frequently cited with approval121 and stands as New York
law. 122 Moreover, it is bolstered by the fact that similar exculpatory provisions insulating telephone companies from liability for
providing inadequate service in the absence of gross negligence
or willful misconduct have long been held not to violate public
policy.123
Unlike the customers of regulated utilities, the customers of
quasi-public entities such as common carriers124 are free, at least
in theory, to choose whether or not to deal with any particular
carrier or whether to use such services at all. The reality, however, is hardly one of independent arms-length bargaining. The
carrier's involvement in matters of "public interest" is deemed
sufficiently great so that its freedom of contract cannot be absolute. A common carrier is generally required to deal with anyone
wishing to use its service; it cannot pick and choose its customers as would a truly private concern. 12G Further, its rates may be
regulated by state or federal law, at least to the extent of
prohibiting discrimination among its users.126
A full discussion of the law of common carriers, or even a

121 See, e.g., Sisters of St. Dominic v. Orange & Rockland Power Co., 79 A.D.2d
1021, 435 N.Y.S.2d 332 (2d Dep't 1981); LoVico v. Consolidated Edison Co., 99 Misc. 2d
897,420 N.Y.S.2d 825 (Sup. Ct. App. Term 2d Dep't 1979); Devers v. Long Island Lighting Co., 79 Misc. 2d 165, 359 N.Y.S.2d 940 (Sup. Ct. App. Term 2d Dep't 1974).
122 In Food Pageant, Inc. v. Consolidated Edison Co., 54 N.Y.2d 167, 172, 445
N.Y.S.2d 60, 61-62 (1981), the New York Court of Appeals accepted without question the
effectiveness of Con Ed's tariff clause.
U. See Jurewicz v. Lucarelli, 77 A.D.2d 751, 751, 431 N.Y.S.2d 186, 188 (3d Dep't
1980); Long Island Central Station, Inc. v. New York Tel. Co., 54 A.D.2d 893, 893, 387
N.Y.S.2d 897, 898 (2d Dep't 1976). But see Denmark v. New York Tel. Co., 97 Misc. 2d
205, 209, 411 N.Y.S.2d 506, 511 (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct. 1978). The same legal standard is applicable to omissions or errors in the preparation of telephone directories. See Hamilton
Employment Servo V. New York Tel. Co., 253 N.Y. 468, 471-72,171 N.E. 710, 711 (1930);
Russell V. New York Tel. Co., 57 Misc. 2d 227, 228, 291 N.Y.S.2d 709, 711 (Sup. Ct.
Suffolk County 1968); Thonn V. New York Tel. Co., 55 Misc. 2d 586, 588, 285 N.Y.S.2d
926, 928 (Sup. Ct: Bronx County 1967).
u, For the definition of "common carrier" see N.Y. TRANSP. LAW § 2(7) (McKinney
1975).
'25 See Gerhard & Hey, Inc. V. Cattaraugus T. Co., 241 N.Y. 413, 417, 150 N.E.2d
500, 501 (1926) ("A common carrier .•• is one who agrees for a specified compensation
to transport such property ••. for all persons that see fit to employ him."). Accord
Weiss Bros. V. De Martis, 14 Misc. 2d 522, 524, 179 N.Y.S.2d 723, 725 (Sup. Ct. New
York County 1958). See generally 17 N.Y. JUR. 2d Carriers §§ 2,3 (1981).
U. See, e.g., 49 U.S.C. § 10701(a) (Supp. IV 1980) (common carriers may only charge
"reasonable" rates); N.Y. TRANSP. LAW § 102 (McKinney 1975) (prohibiting discrimination among customers of common carriers).
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review of the detailed aspects of that law relating to the ability
of carriers to limit their liability by contract, is well beyond the
scope of this Article. Of interest in the present context is the
type of rules, seen in broad outline, that have evolved to deal
with the questions of such quasi-public institutions. These are in
a sense hybrid entities, and it is not surprising that the rules
that have developed are themselves hybrids. Common carriers
may not simply limit their liability to levels deemed acceptable
by the state as is the case with true public service providers such
as electric companies. But neither are their obligations absolute;
they may in some cases insulate themselves, at least with respect
to the extent of their liability. When and how they may do so is
not treated purely as a matter of private bargaining. The law
recognizes that individuals are not in a position to bargain over
the terms and conditions of their carriage. The customer makes
a decision, but it is basically whether to use the service and by
so doing accede to the rate structure already in place. That
structure may give the customer certain defined options, but it is
not open for negotiation.127
Exculpatory provisions in contracts for carriage are generally held violative of public policy, but only where the user is
given no choice between full or limited liability.12s This qualification stands not for the opportunity for individual bargaining
and adjustment of rights as is assumed to be present in the classic contracting situation, but for a system under which the carrier must offer the user some choice among previously established rates corresponding to varying degrees of protection.
Individual bargains over the degrees of liability that the carrier
will assume are not contemplated, or even allowed,!2!) but the
carrier is expected to include in its published rate structure the
opportunity to purchase a greater degree of protection at additional cost. This compromise was apparently first a creation of
the common law/SO but is now typically found in legislation gov-

127

128

See N.Y. TRANsp. LAw § 103 (McKinney 1975).
See Melodee Lane Lingerie Co. v. American Diat. TeL Co., 18 N.Y.2d 57, 69-70,

218 N.E.2d 661, 667-68, 271 N.Y.S.2d 932, 946 (1966); Montalbano v. New York Central
R. Co., 267 A.D. 617, 620, 47 N.Y.S.2d 877, 880 (4th Dep't 1944).
1•• See N.Y. TRANsp. LAw § 103 (McKinney 1975).
130 See Herzog, Validity of Contracts Exempting Carriers in Interstate and Foreign
Commerce From Liability, 11 SYRACUSE L. REv. 171, 172 (1960); Note, Damages-Carn-

ers-Limited Liability - Effects of Failure to Charge Rate Specified in Filed Tariff -
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erning common carriers. 131
The base measure of liability from which variations are to
be made, and the allocation of the burden between the carrier
and its customers to seek out variation from this norm, are
treated differently in the cases of limitations relating to injury to
the person or property. Limitations on damages due to negligently caused personal injury are held violative of public policy
and will not be enforced, but only where passengers have paid
"full fare" for their transportation. Where a carrier agrees to
transport a passenger at a reduced rate, he may legally limit his
liability for personal injuries. 132 In the case of property damage,
the carrier will typically impose a ceiling on its liability unless
the owner has declared his goods to be of greater value and has
paid an additional fee for their protection. 133 The dollar limitation made part of the carrier's regular rate need not be agreed to
by any individual owner, but the limitation generally must be
stated in the tariff, and notice of the limitation and of the opportunity for greater coverage must be conspicuously posted.l 34
This type of compromise between the notion of unfettered
freedom of contract and the public policy favoring protection of
consumers is seen in at least two other similar situations. The
Uniform Commercial Code provisions regulating warehousemen
and warehouse receipts permit damages to be limited by the
terms of the warehouse receipt, provided that the bailor has the
opportunity to increase the limitation by paying a higher rate. 13G
It is also general practice for telegraph companies to limit their
liability by including notices on their forms, and to offer varying

W.R. Grace & Co. v. Railway Express Agency, 25 ALB. L. REV. 160, 161 (1961).
131 See N.Y. TRANSP. LAW § 109 (McKinney 1975) (carriers may impose a "reasona·
ble charge" for accepting liability in excess of $150); id. § 174 (motor carriers may limit
liability based upon declared value of freight).
132 See Hopkins v. Long Island R.R. Co., 21 A.D.2d 814, 815, 251 N.Y.S.2d 590, 591
(2d Dep't 1964); McDougall v. Lehigh Valley R.R. Co., 21 Misc. 2d 946, 947, 198
N.Y.S.2d 91, 92 (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct. 1959). See generally 7 N.Y. JUR. Carriers §§ 399·409
(1959).
13. See generally 7 N.Y. JUR. Carriers §§ 195-234, 448-54 (1959).
"4 See, e.g., Egan v. Kollsman Instrument Corp., 21 N.Y.2d 160, 171-72, 234 N.E.2d
199, 204, 287 N.Y.S.2d 14, 19-20 (1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 1039 (1967); Greenberg v.
United Airlines, Inc., 98 Misc. 2d 544, 545, 414 N.Y.S.2d 240, 241 (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct. 1979) •
... See Kimberly-Clark Corp. v. Lake Erie Warehouse Div., 49 A.D.2d 492, 494-95,
375 N.Y.S.2d 918, 921 (4th Dep't 1975), appeal dismissed, 39 N.Y.2d 888, 352 N.E.2d
580,386 N.Y.S.2d 393 (1976); N.Y.U.C.C. § 7-204 (McKinney 1964). See generally 9 N.Y.
JUR. 2d Bailments and Chattel Leases §§ 63-70 (1980).
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degrees of protection corresponding to varying rates for different
services. These limitations have been upheld and have become
part of the telegraph companies' general tariffs as provided for
in state and federal law. l36

V. THE

RESIDUAL CASE

This Article began with the question of how the "contract
law of New York" treats provisions purporting to limit or disclaim liability. Having described the various areas that have
been carved out for special treatment, either by the Code, by
statute, or by court decreed exceptions, we are left with the
question of how the common law deals with the residual case
that fits into none of these special situations. The most interesting thing about the residual case may be how infrequently it
arises; the exceptions have not completely done away with the
rule, but their very existence (and their number, variety, com. plenty and scope) make it impossible not to see the traditional
and historic common law response in a far different light.l37 The
general statements of law relevant to such exculpatory clauses
may seem less than they once would have, broad powerful statements of policy telling us how "the law" in its wisdom reacts to
such human activity. They now seem almost to be statements
about the exceptional situation: unless the case involves the sale
of goods, a lease, a construction contract, a common carrier, a
caterer or what-have-you, this is to be the law.l3s
138 See, e.g., Sims v. Western Union TeL Co., 37 Misc. 2d 943, 946, 236 N.Y.8.2d
192, 195 (Sup. Ct. Erie County 1963). See generally 58A N.Y. Jun. Telecommunications
§§ 97-100 (1977).
137 The number of cases in which the "exceptions" apply is multiplied by the tendency of some courts to analogize to the Uniform Commercial Code in situations otherwise governed by common law principles. See note 4 supra.
1 . . In fact, the largest group of cases where the common law rules hnve been applied
involve a type of contract where the disputed provision is written in such a way that it
does not appear to be governed by the rules at all. Burglary alarm contracts typically
include a provision whereby the parties agree that a fixed sum will constitute "liquidated
damages" in the event of a breach. A true liquidated damages clause, of couree, is distinct from the kind of clause that is the subject of our discussion, but the New York
courts have recognized that these provisions are actually attempts to limit the potential
liability of the alarm companies, and thus are subject to the common law restrictions on
such provisions. See Rinaldi & Sons, Inc. v. Wells Fargo Alarm Serv., Inc., 47 A.D.2d
462,467, 367 N.Y.S.2d 518, 522 (2d Dep't 1975), reu'd on other grounds, 39 N.Y.2d 191,
347 N.E.2d 618, 383' N.Y.S.2d 256 (1976). These provisions are uniformly upheld. See
Florence v. Merchants Central Alarm Co., 51 N.Y.2d 794, 795, 412 N.E.2d 1317, 1318,
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The classic common law approach to exculpatory clauses in
what I have called the residual case is well illustrated by the
recent case of Gross v. Sweet,139 where the New York Court of
Appeals examined the effect of a "Responsibility Release" executed by a student in a parachute jumping school.140 The court
held that the release would not bar recovery if negligence could
be shown. 141 While acknowledging that exculpatory agreements
are completely void where they grant protection from claims
based on willful conduct or gross negligence,142 the court determined that such agreements might be effective when limited to
claims based on simple negligence. 143 The court emphasized,
however, that the law generally "frowns upon" such attempts to
limit liability for negligence and only "grudgingly accepts" the
proposition that parties to an agreement may contract in this
way.144 Accordingly, the court held that exculpatory clauses
would be denied effect unless the parties' intent is "expressed in

433 N.Y.S.2d 91-92 (1980); Chami v. Automatic Burglar Alarm Corp., 106 Misc. 2d 559,
562, 434 N.Y.S.2d 330, 332 (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct. 1980); Public Servo Mut. Ins. Co. v. Royal
Burglar & Fire Alarm, Inc., 90 Misc. 2d 517, 518, 394 N.Y.S.2d 524, 525 (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct.
1977).
Perhaps the most interesting aspect of the common law decisions in this area is the
extent to which they encourage legislative intervention. Prior to Gross V. Sweet, 49
N.Y.2d 102, 400 N.E.2d 306, 424 N.Y.S.2d 365 (1979), see notes 139-49 and accompanying text infra, the leading New York case discussing the common law of exculpatory
clauses was Ciofalo V. Vic Tanney Gyms, Inc., 10 N.Y.2d 294, 177 N.E.2d 925, 220
N.Y.S.2d 962 (1961), in which the New York Court of Appeals upheld a limitation of
liability for negligence included in a membership contract of a private gymnasium. Later
decisions upheld the same type of clause. See Whalen V. Vic Tanney Hicksville, Inc., 23
A.D.2d 778, 258 N.Y.S.2d 562 (2d Dep't 1965); Putzer V. Vic-Tanney-Flatbush, Inc., 20
A.D.2d 821, 248 N.Y.S.2d 836 (2d Dep't 1964). In 1976, the legislature added a section to
the General Obligations Law which rendered all such provisions void. See N.Y: GEN.
OBLIG. LAW § 5-326 (McKinney 1978); see notes 103-04 and accompanying text supra.
IS. 49 N.Y.2d 102, 400 N.E.2d 306, 424 N.Y.S.2d 365 (1979).
140 ld. at 105, 400 N.E.2d at 308, 424 N.Y.S.2d at 366.
141 ld. at 105, 400 N.E.2d at 307, 424 N.Y.S.2d at 366.
141 ld. at 106, 400 N.E.2d at 308, 424 N.Y.S.2d at 367.
148 ld. at 107-08, 400 N.E.2d at 309, 424 N.Y.S.2d at 368. The court acknowledged
the existence of certain situations where exculpatory clauses are unenforceable regardless
of the degree of negligence involved. ld. at 109, 400 N.E.2d at 310, 424 N.Y.S.2d at 369.
One such situation, which would be of little applicability today, is the old common law
prohibition against an employer imposing on an employee a limitation of negligence liability as a condition of employment. See Johnston v. Fargo, 184 N.Y. 379, 77 N.E. 388
(1906).
144 49 N.Y.2d at 106,110, 400 N.E.2d at 308, 311, 424 N.Y.S.2d at 367,370. See, e.g.,
Gottschalk V. Consolidated R.R. Corp., 469 F. Supp. 254, 257 (S.D:N.Y. 1979); Phibbs v.
Ray's Chevrolet, Inc., 45 A.D.2d 897, 357 N.Y.S.2d 211, 213 (3d Dep't 1974).
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unmistakeable language. "14G The court noted that if the parties
intend to exclude liability for negligence the fairest and best
course is to provide explicitly that such claims are included.
While the word "negligence" need not actually appear in the
clause, it must include words conveying a similar import.140 This
test has been applied to hold such provisions to a very high
standard. In particular, its effect is to invalidate provisions written in broad and general terms, as where one party agrees not to
hold the other party liable for "any and all" injuries which
might arise for "any and all reasons."147 Thus, in Gross, the
plaintiff's agreement to waive "any and all claims • . . for any
personal injuries or property damage . • . which may arise" was
held not to bar the plaintiff's action.148 In the court's view, the
clause merely alerted the plaintiff to the dangers inherent in the
training - that "accidents will happen" - and to the instructor's refusal to assume the role of an insurer of the plaintiff's
safety in all events.149 The clause did not sufficiently alert the
plaintiff that there were particular risks, what the court refers to
as "enhanced exposure to injury," resulting from the fault of the
instructor to live up to his duty of care, for which the instruct~r
would normally be expected to pay but which the student was in
this instance being asked to bear. IGO
Thus, for a clause to pass the strict scrutiny of the court, we
may conclude that it should speak directly to the situation at
hand, to the particular risks involved that one party is seeking
to shift to the other, and to the fact that this is an attempt to
shift these risks off of the shoulders of the party whom we would
normally expect to bear them. The decisions indicate that explicit reference to negligence will meet this test, as where one
party agrees not to hold the other liable for "any and all injuries,
including those caused by your failure to use due care.U1111 Cases
upholding such provisions usually involve even more particular-

14&

49 N.Y.2d at 107, 400 N.E.2d at 309, 424 N.Y.S.2d at 368.

14' Id. at 108, 400 N.E.2d at 310, 424 N.Y.S.2d at 369.
147

Id. at 108-09, 400 N.E.2d at 310, 424 N.y.s.2d at 369.

14' Id. at 109-10, 400 N.E.2d at 310-11, 424 N.y.s.2d at 369·70.
Id. at 109, 400 N.E.2d at 310-11, 424 N.Y.S.2d at 369.
Id. at 109, 400 N.E.2d at 311, 424 N.Y.S.2d at 369.
m See, e.g., Ciofalo v. Vic Tanney Gyms, Inc., 10 N.Y.2d 294, 296, 177 N.E.2d 925,
926, 220 N.Y.S.2d 962, 964 (1961); Franzek v. Calspan Corp., 78 A.D.2d 134, 137, 434
N.Y.S.2d 288, 290 (4th Dep't 1980).
148
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ized language. For example, in Mutual Marine Office, Inc. v.
Atwell, Vogel & Sterling, Inc.,tfJ2 an insurance inspecting firm
escaped liability for a faculty inspection report under two exculpatory provisions. One provision of the inspection report stated
that "[w]e do not assume any legal liability due to misinformation given our inspector, nor for inaccuracies, human error,
etc."lfJ3 In addition, the plaintiff had been given a booklet entitled "Outline of Operations," which expressly disclaimed liability for errors or omissions in the defendant's inspection report.
The booklet pointed to the limited expertise of the auditors and
to their dependence upon information provided by the insured
in making their reports. 1M Under these circumstances, the court
had little difficulty upholding the limitation of liability as an effectively bargained allocation of risk.
Once an exculpatory clause is worded with sufficient clarity,
the courts will not be concerned with whether a party was actually aware of its existence or had read it. The only requirement
is that the clause could have been read with no unusual difficulty; an unsuspecting party will not be bound by a hidden or
illegible provision. 1fJfJ While the courts will insist that a limitation not be "so obscured . . . as to make it probable that it
would escape [a party's] attention,"lfJ6 the test is not as strict as
the "conspicuousness" requirement of the Uniform Commercial
Code.1fJ7 In Florence v. Merchants Central Alarm CO.,lIlB the

102
103

I"

485 F. Supp. 351 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).

Id. at 353.
Id. at 354. For other examples of sufficiently well-written exculpatory clauses, see

Della Corte v. Village of Williston Park, 60 A.D.2d 639,640,400 N.Y.S.2d 357, 358 (2d
Dep't 1977) (engineer's report covered only such portions of property as "may be examined visually"); Piercy v. Citibank, N.A., 101 Misc. 2d 302, 304, 424 N.Y.S.2d 76, 77
(Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1978) (investment advisor disclaimed liability for his actions or
omissions other than "williul misconduct").
I~~ See Florence v. Merchants Central Alarm Co., 51 N.Y.2d 794, 795, 412 N.E.2d
1317,1318,433 N.Y.S.2d 91, 92 (1980); Franzek v. Calspan Corp., 78 A.D.2d 134, 138,434
N.Y.S.2d 288, 290 (4th Dep't 1980).
1116 Florence v. Merchants Central Alram Co., 51 N.Y.2d 794, 795, 412 N.E.2d 1317,
1318, 433 N.Y.S.2d 91, 92 (1980). See Gross v. Sweet, 49 N.Y.2d 102, 107, 400 N.E.2d
306, 309, 424 N.Y.S.2d 365, 368 (1979) ("[A] provision that would exempt its drafter
from any liability occasioned by his fault should not compel resort to a magnifying glass
and a lexicon.").
1~7 See Arnold v. New City Condo. Corp., 78 A.D.2d 882, 433 N.Y.S.2d 196, 198 (2d
Dep't 1980) (disclaimer not invalid because it appeared in same type size as surrounding
language). The Code expressly requires that disclaimers be "conspicuous." See
N.Y.U.C.C. § 2-316(2) (McKinney 1964); notes 18-23 and accompanying text supra.
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CONTRACTUAL DISCLAIMER

New York Court of Appeals upheld a limitation included, but
not highlighted, in a contract printed in uniform size type on the
face of one sheet of paper and that contained no paragraph
headings or subtitles that could mislead a reader.llls Such a provision would probably not meet the Code's test.
.
It should be noted, however, that in Florence the court was
faced with a contract arising in a commercial setting, a factor of
obvious importance in the resolution of such cases. Although
this factor is not dispositive, and while exculpatory clauses have
been upheld in a consumer setting,160 the scrutiny given such
clauses presumably is heightened by their appearance in a consumer "adhesion contract.1J16l On the other hand, faced with a
limitation made part of an agreement between two supposedly
sophisticated commercial parties, the courts are less quick to
find them ineffective. In such cases the courts are hesitant to
undo what they believe the parties have done and to set aside a
legitimate allocation of business risk knowingly entered into.102

51 N.Y.2d 794, 412 N.E.2d 1317, 433 N.Y.S.2d 91 (1980).
ld. at 795, 412 N.E.2d at 1318, 433 N.Y.s.2d at 92.
100 See, e.g., Della Corte v. Village of Williston Park, 60 A.D.2d 639, 400 N.Y.S.2d
357 (2d Dep't 1977) (contract for real property inspection report); Piercy v. Citib:mk,
NA, 101 Misc. 2d 302, 424 N.Y.S.2d 76 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1978) (contrnct for investment advice). It should be noted that in both of these cases the cost of the service3
was presumably very low in comparison with the amount of the damage claimed, and the
liability limitation was spelled out in great detail See note 153 supra.
U1 In fact, there seem to be few recent cases decided on common law principles
where New York courts have had to take on this "consumer protection" role. Presumably
this is attributable to the wide scope of the Uniform Commercial Code and the other
statutory provisions discussed in this Article.
lOS In B.V.D. Co. v. Marine Midland Bank-New York, 46 A.D.2d 51, 360 N.Y.s.2d
901 (1st Dep't 1974), the court held that the policy of invalidating disclaimer and limitation clauses on public policy grounds did not extend to major commercial dealings, stating that the policy "can have no application to agreements made by a corporate body of
vast experience, continuously advised by counsel at every step in the proceeding." ld. at
53, 360 N.Y.S.2d 901. See also Mutual Marine Office, Inc. v. Atwell, Vogel & Sterling,
Inc., 485 F. Supp. 351, 355 (S.D.N.Y. 1980); Hong Kong Export Credit Ins. Corp. v. Dun
& Bradstreet, 414 F. Supp. 153, 158 (S.D.N.Y. 1975). The New York Court of Appeals, in
Gross v. Sweet, also recognized this principle in distinguishing n line of cases dellling
with exoneration clauses in indemnification agreements. The court indicated that such
agreements are usually "negotiated at arm's length between. • • sophisticated busines3
entities." 49 N.Y.2d at 108, 400 N.E.2d at 310, 424 N.Y.S.2d at 368.
lOS
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